From inferiority complex to big ego: the CCP’s diplomatic master plan| Tzou Wen-Feng
It is customary for all CCP departments and ministries to look back at the work of this year and make plans for the next at the year-end. For the party’s system for handling foreign affairs, this is not an exception. As next year marks the centenary of the CCP, its diplomatic moves have, quite naturally, attracted all kinds of attention.
This month Wang Yi, the CCP’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, first made a speech on the 11th at the “Symposium on the International Situation and China’s Foreign Relations in 2020” organized by the China Institute of International Studies, a CCP thinktank. Then on the 18th, he expounded on the CCP’s proposals for the development of Sino-US relations at a video conference jointly organized by China’s academia and the Asia Society, an American private research institution. The two speeches can be seen as a summary of the year as well as an attempt at propaganda and a trial balloon. However, it is the real situation behind these speeches and the diplomatic strategies reflected by them that are worth a closer study after all the CCP talk is deciphered.
Wang boasted about China’s eight major diplomatic achievements of the year. They include the initiation of global cooperation on the fight against the pandemic, the expansion of opening up, the stabilization of the international situation, the deepening of the “community of shared destiny on the periphery”, the protection of the interests of developing countries, participation in the reform of the global governance system, the protection of the country’s interests and the dignity of its people, and the implementation of “diplomacy for the people”.
Diplomatic effort to tackle anti-China camp
The CCP’s logic is this: it was exactly because of China’s unparalleled “achievements” in its control of the pandemic, its cooperation with numerous countries on the fight against the pandemic, its resumption of work and production, and its restoration of economic growth that have lent China’s “diplomatic journey” its groundbreaking significance. The achievements have also made this year worth celebrating and boasting about. Wang even sang the praises of “Chairman Xi”, lauding him for employing “innovative cloud diplomacy” to forge a “global consensus” with leaders around the globe. In fact, the so-called “cloud diplomacy” is merely video conferences – so where is the “innovation”? And let’s not forget that it is the CCP that has caused the spread of the global pandemic and large-scale economic recession, as a result of which important conferences have had to be held via video conferencing. The CCP has the effrontery to boast about it. To put it simply, it is being self-congratulatory at the expense of others.
As for the focus of next year, it will include an all-out effort to support its developmental strategies, its support for global economic recovery, the building of “a new form of international relations” and “a community of shared destiny”, the continued deepening of international cooperation, the active participation in the reform of global governance, and the promotion of mutual understanding between nations. These objectives are not only about the realization of the “China Dream”, which is about striving for a corresponding status for a great nation, a long-term strategic operation. They are also about the necessary strategic moves for the celebration of the centenary of the CCP and the alignment with the “Fourteenth Five-Year Plan”. However, as can be seen from the fact that Wang made use of another open occasion to express “hope” about Sino-US relations for next year, the Beijing authorities are under pressure to stabilize the external environment and tackle the anti-China camp next year, so much so that failure is not an option.
Gaining a say through vaccines and climate issue
It is indeed a relatively unusual practice to target a specific country in the year-end conclusion. It can be seen that China has indeed been intimidated and weakened by the Trump administration’s unpredictability, its strategy that borders on maximum pressure, and its all-out containment of China. It has been a difficult wait for Joe Biden’s swearing-in. Beijing definitely needs to seize this rare opportunity actively.
But the CCP also understands very well that Biden might take the same tough policies against China, and the difference might lie in strategies merely. Furthermore, as Biden has made Antony Blinken and Jake Sullivan in charge of US diplomacy and named Katherine Tai US Trade Representative, it is obvious that he will not stop pressurizing China. To control risk and extend an olive branch, Wang Yi first reiterated that China’s diplomacy is about “not claiming hegemony, not interfering in other countries’ affairs, not exporting its systems, and not building a sphere of influence”. He also invoked Xi’s congratulatory call to Biden, in which Xi expressed the hope of building a stable Sino-US relationship that is without conflicts, without confrontation, mutually respectful and mutually beneficial. Xi also mentioned three areas, namely the fight against the pandemic, economics and climate change, on which the two countries can cooperate extensively, expressing hope that the two countries can handle conflicts regarding ideology, sovereignty, trade, sea navigation and cultural exchanges constructively.
The CCP has long regarded diplomacy towards the US as a matter of crucial importance. This also reveals the direction of its planned diplomatic moves for next year. First, in terms of strategies, China will, through its “vaccine diplomacy” and “climate diplomacy”, try to prevent an anti-China alliance from taking shape. Although in general the international community has misgivings about vaccines made in China, we cannot deny that the urgency of saving lives trumps all other matters. This is exactly where Beijing has identified an opportunity. First, it conducted vaccine trials in nearly 20 countries, before announcing that it would “preferentially” sell several hundred million vaccines to these countries alongside the provision of huge sums of money in “loans”. By providing a solution to the problems it created, Beijing has gained the silence of geopolitically unfriendly countries on the periphery of the South China Sea and the basin of the Mekong River and the “friendship” of some Southeast Asian, Latin American and African countries, thus expanding its global influence in the field of public health.
As for the climate issue, Xi has made repeated promises openly this year that mainland China’s carbon emission will peak by 2030 and will achieve carbon neutrality by 2060 so as to shoulder its “international responsibility”. What is even more important for China is to gain a say internationally and use this to sound out the US in an attempt to resume dialogue.
“Community of shared destiny” diplomacy
Second, strategically, China is trying to ensure that it has paved the way for its achieving the status as a great nation by building the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), signing “mega” free trade agreements between China and Europe, Japan or South Korea, and gaining control of international organizations. The former is aimed at leveraging the interconnectedness of trade in the globalization era so that the international community is unable to decouple itself from China. As for the latter, although Western countries are already alarmed at China’s long-time infiltration into multilateral frameworks, Beijing has, by offering benefits to a majority of developing countries, continued to press ahead with all kinds of “community of shared destiny” diplomacy. Under all kinds of pretexts such as regions, development, ecology, security and public health, it has mingled with the interests of different nations. Beijing then strives for the right to write the rules in new areas such as carbon emission trading and network space and pushes for the reform of global governance. Its aim is to build the so-called “new international relations” gradually that correspond with its developmental strategy.
No doubt Beijing’s diplomatic game plan is magnificent, and it is certain that it is difficult to exclude the CCP from a global economic recovery. However, those who are informed at Zhongnanhai are also well aware that the CCP’s diplomatic limitations, as well as the wave of anti-China sentiments internationally, stem from its unique totalitarian mindset and system of political values.
Obscure hidden messages behind its policies
Diplomacy is a reflection of domestic issues. Beijing’s foreign policies, in particular, are full of obscure hidden messages. Though Beijing “will not claim hegemony”, it needs the privileged status of a major power. It “will not interfere in other countries’ affairs”, but Australia is the best example of how a country that raises Beijing’s hackles will fare. It “will not export its systems”, but it is tutoring politicians in developing countries with its so-called experience of governance. It is also exporting “Xi Jinping thought”. It “will not build up a sphere of influence”, but it is quick to prevent “outside forces” from interfering in Asian-Pacific affairs. The CCP’s diplomacy is linked with its propaganda. It masquerades as a major power, but its big ego that originates from its extremely low self-esteem remains unchanged.
What is tragic and dangerous in today’s international politics is that the future development of human societies is still at the mercy of an authoritarian regime, and that all the countries in the world are still in two minds about confronting the expansion of the CCP or expecting Beijing to dole out resources. As 2021 is approaching, how the international community should counter the CCP’s expansionism and whether the CCP’s diplomacy will have a difficult or easy ride are closely related to us and deserving of our attention.
(Tzou Wen-Feng, China political observer)
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