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China-Hong Kong relations in five words|Leung Kai-chi

蘋果日報 2020/12/30 09:44


As we come to the end of the year, it is time to prepare for the next semester. When I picked up the syllabus of my China-Hong Kong relations course, I felt very sad. Being a university lecturer today is sometimes no different from being a bandleader on the Titanic: when the ship is about to sink and the guests are running away, do we still pretend it is business as usual and continue to perform? Do we really need another semester to finish the topic of China-Hong Kong relations? Or can the five words “central government has the final say” already sum up everything?
That is not how it was supposed to be. There was a time when I felt that there was so much to cover that I was worried about not having enough class time. When we talked about the judiciary ten years ago, we would talk first about the role of the Department of Justice (DoJ) in the case of Sally Aw Sian, then about the issue of jurisdiction in the case of Cheung Tsz Keung, and finally about the interpretation of the Basic Law by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) in the case of Ng Ka Ling. Nowadays, there are endless examples of problems with the DoJ; there are Xiao Jianhua, the case of Causeway Bay’s missing booksellers, and the co-location arrangement. The NPC has interpreted the Basic Law over and over again, and now there are all kinds of “NPC decisions” that directly conflict with the Basic Law. And this is even before we get to the part about law enforcement agencies. Just the investigation of the internal culture of the Hong Kong Police Force in the annex of the Independent Police Complaints Council (IPCC) report is already half a lecture.
It should be stated in advance that, no matter how heated the public sentiment, the university’s China-Hong Kong relations course always analyzes events in an academic manner. As a matter of fact, in the past, many things in Hong Kong that seemed incredibly odd often had a very rational explanation behind them. For example, the high level of distrust in the government sometimes seems irrational. However, when you consider how the Chief Executive often makes 180 degree turns and completely changes her prior opinions in front of the privileged class of the Election Committee, it is no wonder that people do not take the government’s promises seriously. Another example is the filibuster and the banana-throwing by the democrats in the Legislative Council (LegCo), which also seems irrational. However, when you consider how the functional constituencies and the split voting system limit the representativeness of the LegCo, and how the Hong Kong-style proportional representation system encourages the democrats to split up, it is actually quite normal for the democrats to treat the LegCo as a performance venue. Usually, at this point, the topic is led to institutionalism in the social sciences, where students discuss whether it is inevitable that “the backside dictates the brain.”
Even when it comes to the direct intervention of the central government, there were many things that had to be explained slowly in the past. For example, the trilogy of political reform in the Basic Law had become a five-part series. The central government has introduced a mechanism to invoke power over Hong Kong’s political reform, and the key lies in the phrase “if there is a need to amend the electoral methods” in the provision. The words “if there is a need” have been interpreted as “if the central government thinks there is a need, then there is a need; if the central government thinks there is no need, then there is no need.” However, in view of the Aug 31st incident, the word “need” was further contorted from a question of right and wrong to a list of conditions, that is, “the central government will decide what is necessary in accordance with the scope set by the central government.”
There is also the provision in the Basic Law that “the government of the HKSAR may exercise immigration controls.” There is the view that the word “may” means that although the SAR government has the right to do so, it does not mean that solely the SAR government has the right to do so. For example, it is possible for the central government to deny entry to certain people it does not like. At this point, although ordinary people would feel there is a bit of wordplay and exploitation of legal ambiguities, at least it is a subject that can and needs to be explained in the classroom, and whether you agree or disagree is another matter.
The developments in the past six months have often made me feel that things have gone beyond what can and needs to be explained. For example, a large number of provisions in the National Security Law are in direct contradiction with the Basic Law. For example, if it is said that national security-related expenditures are not subject to supervision, this is obviously not in line with the Basic Law, which stipulates that the LegCo can oversee the government and that residents have the right to bring charges against the government. So, is the National Security Law or the Basic Law more powerful? In fact, this question was raised by legal scholars before the National Security Law was enacted. They argued that the status of the Basic Law was relatively weak in relation to the Chinese Constitution. If the NPC enacts legislation that violates the Basic Law in the future, Hong Kong people will not have much leeway to protect themselves. These concerns, which existed only in scholarly monographs at the time, are now the reality of the law. The scholars do not know what else to do now other than to tell their students that “we have already discussed this before.”
At a time when all kinds of “NPC decisions” can blatantly contradict the Basic Law, and when the previous practice of wordplays and taking advantage of loopholes can be dispensed, it can be said to some extent that university courses on China-Hong Kong relations have become redundant. After all, the words “central government has the final say” can overrule everything, and it would be undoubtedly impractical to have serious discussions on various institutional mechanisms. Or maybe we can teach the Basic Law in the history department and treat it as a part of Hong Kong’s past.
There is a third possibility. In the face of institutional failure, we look for possibilities outside the system. Within the system, there is no longer any room as a result of the various disqualifications and oath-taking arrangements. However, outside the system, there are still many people working hard to build a different kind of relationship between Hong Kong and China. Some of them are documenting the history of Hong Kong’s folk culture, some are writing about street culture and life, and some are hosting study groups to welcome mainland Chinese students. Although these efforts will not change the political landscape of Hong Kong and China in the near future, as long as they are pushing for something other than what is officially approved, they are already building alternative possibilities for Hong Kong-China relations. If we focus our attention on these efforts, then the phrase that describes the relationship between China and Hong Kong will become “Hong Kong people saving themselves.”
(Leung Kai-chi, current affairs commentator)
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