In recent years, China has frequently harassed Vietnamese and Malaysian vessels and oil drilling platforms in the South China Sea and pounded the Philippines' fishing boats. In addition, it has been running into conflicts with Japan in the waters surrounding the Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. The way China is taking advantage of the “gray area” is in violation of international norms and law and is uncalled for if it simply wants to compete with other countries. Yet the actions are not strong enough to be considered military attacks, so that the countries threatened by China’s actions cannot take effective countermeasures. This article puts forward some strategic suggestions in response to China’s “gray-areaactions” against Taiwan.

Information warfare involves gathering information on the enemy’s tactics and pushing political propaganda, so as to achieve competitive advantages over the enemy. In this regard, there are two types of tactics: mounting attacks through infiltration in the cyber space and disseminating false information. Both tactics are meant to drive public opinion and exert an impact on the decision-making process of the authorities concerned, thus destabilizing a country.

Taiwan is a democratic country. If the government uses its public power to determine what information is false and then refute such information, it would become a judge who determines what are truths and what are not. It would also become exhausted dealing with an avalanche of false information, and Taiwan’s freedom of speech could be jeopardized.

Take Estonia, which has been under all-round threat from Russia. In 2007, the Baltic country’s infrastructural facilities became paralyzed as a result of cyber attacks. In recent years, all manner of false information has emerged. However, the Estonian government does not deal with such information directly, as it wants to cultivate people’s media literacy and create a protective mechanism against false information and cyber attacks. Such a policy may not produce any result in the short run, and yet it is the way to resolve the fundamental problem. Taiwan can learn from that.

The Third Department of the Sixth Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department, located in Wuhan, targeted Taiwan’s hacker force. In 2016, however, the department was reorganized and became the Network System Department under the PLA’s Strategic Support Force, numbered 61726. The new department’s target is still Taiwan but the scope of its operations is broader and more aggressive. Taiwan is often treated as their training ground.

For Taiwan, the cost of defending itself against Chinese hackers is extremely high and the defense is not necessarily 100 percent effective. As such, Taiwan can step up efforts to promote public-private partnerships. Generally speaking, the anti-hacking operating system is set in motion only after a cyber attack is exposed. But public-private partnerships specializing in cyber defense are founded on the sharing of intelligence between private industries and the government (including its intelligence unit). It is about taking the initiative to deal with threats. More

importantly, Taiwan should develop for its national security system a hacker force that targets China’s gray-area actions.

Before 2019, most of America’s efforts in dealing with China’s theft of technology involved transparent means such as gathering evidence, prosecution and diplomacy, but the effectiveness of such means was limited. At the end of 2018, the U.S. Department of Defense announced a cyber strategy that encompassed intelligence collection, preparation for cyber warfare, and attempts to stop cyber offensives (such as activity below the level of armed conflicts) at the source.

Since March 2019, the U.S. has been conducting cyber operations targeting China. In 2021, the U.S. Department of Defense will carry out “forward capture” missions, which involve deploying cyber forces to other countries to prevent malicious cyber activity. Under this strategy, the U.S. military, upon the invitation of partnering countries, will take joint actions with the latter. The U.S. Cyber Command is now in its second consecutive year to perform operations in Montenegro. Such is America’s new strategy of “persistent engagement”. The U.S. Cyber Command will directly challenge its opponents' attacks in any part of the globe, as part of its forward defense.

In recent years, Chinese fishing vessels and China’s maritime police frigates have been intruding into the waters of Japan’s Senkaku Islands on an increasingly frequent basis. Besides, PLA fighters have been flying near Japan’s airspace from time to time. In April 2019, the U.S. warned China that given their provocative actions, China’s maritime police and maritime militia would be treated by the U.S. Navy as members of a normal navy and would apply rules of engagement to them accordingly without putting up with their actions in the gray area.

The Japanese Self-Defense Force has also strengthened communication with the international community. To present to other countries a clear picture of China’s provocations, the force has been quick to disseminate information on China’s gray zone-operations, including navigation charts, visual intelligence, and quarterly trends. By comparison, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense tends to resort to claims that “everything is under control.”

I suggest adopting offensive strategies instead of defensive. The strategic objectives can include easing Taiwan’s losses in the gray area while striving for strategic advantages, deterring China’s aggressiveness, discouraging China from gradually and continually taking other actions, and calling for the U.S. to lead organizations of other countries and let Taiwan join them.

The tactics used can include putting in place flexible, standard procedures, developing rapid response mechanisms and tools, and taking the initiative to attack instead of staying passive.

We can divide China’s gray-zone actions into different levels and establish strategic goals, tactics, the expected risk and our tolerance level. The following are a few examples as well as countermeasures that Taiwan can consider adopting.

Mild threat 1: when Taiwan is harassed by Chinese maritime militias and fishing boats, Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration can strengthen its unmanned aerial vehicles' reconnaissance, surveillance and interception capabilities, hand over the navy’s older vessels to the Coast Guard Administration, and release related information in detail and data on different trends within Taiwan and to the world timely.

Mild threat 2: when China spreads false information to stir up troubles inTaiwan, Taiwan can educate the public on digital media literacy, develop fast tracking technologies, and enhance its ability to disseminate correct information to China.

Moderate threat 1: when the Chinese cyber army attacks our non-essential infrastructure and steals sensitive information, Taiwan can reinforce its forensic capabilities, educate people on cyber cleanliness to prevent cyber attacks, set up its own national security hacker team, and invite the U.S., Japan and other countries to co-establish a cyber defense center in the Asia-Pacific region.

Moderate threat 2: when PLA fighter planes and warships cause disturbances near Taiwan, Taiwan can unveil intelligence to the international community timely, conduct quarterly analysis, and shape public opinion by grooming legal and political experts who can eloquently present their views to the mainstream international media.

Serious threat 1: when PLA fighter planes cross the center line of the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan can review the existing engagement procedures and make it more deterrent. It can also issue warnings via specific channels, lock in the Chinese target with fire-control radar, and carry out combat readiness cruise with the U.S. and conduct military drills in the airspace near Taiwan.

Serious threat 2: when the Chinese cyber army attacks our essential infrastructure and cause loss of lives and properties, the Taiwanese government can order the country’s hacker force to launch attacks and invite the U.S. Cyber Command to join force to carry out forward capture operations.

On the whole, in case of serious threats to Taiwan, Taiwan can coordinate with the U.S., using force and non-military means to deter the threats and curb any risk that may escalate. In case of medium threats, diplomatic and technological means can be adopted to facilitate communication with the other side and increase the cost that China has to pay. For mild threats, a defensive and resilient approach, together with competitive strategies, should be adopted to ease tension. It is only by putting in place a proper system that enables comprehensive assessment, and by implementing specific strategies accordingly, can we safeguard national security.

(Holmes Liao Hong Xiang, former honorary professor at the Armed Forces College of National Defense University’s)

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