As the political and military interactions between Taiwan and the United States snuggled up, the screams of slaughter from Beijing and part of Taipei have been shouting warnings that “in the next three months, there may be war in the cross-strait regions”; during the U.S. Under Secretary of the State Keith Krach’s visit to Taiwan, 18 Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aircrafts interrupted Taiwan’s airspace on Sep. 18. The PLA Air Force’s mass killer Shenyang J-16 strike fighter jet also appeared in Taiwan’s air defense identification zone for the first time. It seems like a war is about to break out between the two straits at any moment.

A good friend’s son has returned home after serving four months in the military, to take over the family business of four generations. He works hard together with the employees in the factory. Old Dong, who had been fighting the border at Kinmen for two years and now owns a successful business, asked, “Will there be war?!” Dong’s wife asked even more bluntly, “Will my son be drafted when there is a war?”

China’s overall national strength has been increasing rapidly, and national self-confidence has been expanding inexplicably as well. Military reforms have achieved early successes thanks to the support of economic growth; the PLA is yearning to demolish the Western Pacific security structure established by the U.S. military after World War II, the shackles that were imposed upon China. Whether it is to the east of the Miyako Line, or to the south of the Shanba Line, the Chinese People’s Navy and Air Force will for sure pass through Taiwan’s air defense identification zone for outward voyage training. Compared with the inviolability of airspace based on international law, where the flight information zone is defined by the International Civil Aviation Organization, the restriction of the air defense identification zone can only be enforced through subduing provocateurs militarily.

Over the past 20 years, Taiwan and China have undergone fundamental changes in their control over the Taiwan Strait and the surrounding waters. While the Chinese PLA is systematically advancing to a world-class army both in quality and quantity, our national army is under pressure from insufficient manpower and training. As such, American friends kindly use the system and experience of its militia and reserve forces to hope that Taiwan, at the forefront of democracy and freedom in the Western Pacific, can establish a reserve army with a “united front and back” and “consistent in peace and war” to defend Taiwan’s democracy and freedom.

Who are the effective “reserve soldiers” with combat power who can fight for Taiwan on the battlefield? The reserve forces currently planned by the Ministry of National Defense are composed of “reserve fighters” made up of volunteer reserve soldiers, as well as “cyber fighters” made up of reserve soldiers (including compulsory service) from two main bodies with relevant licenses in the fields of information and information security.

In 2020, the Han Kwong Exercise 36 was used as an opportunity to implement the “tri-service joint anti-landing operation” actual military exercise at Jianan Beach, Taichung, to verify the ability of the reserve forces (made up of volunteer veterans, one-year compulsory veterans, and reserve soldiers who have had four-month military training) to conduct a counter-special attack, anti-landing, and anti-air(craft) landing combat maneuvers. In other words, even young people who have only served for four months in the military might be mobilized for actual combat assignments in the future possible defense operations in Taiwan-Penghu regions.

Tsai Ing-wen, the commander of the three armed forces, also advocated to classify and use the reserve officers and soldiers based on their experience and experience at the end of June 2020. The first category is that reserve soldiers with similar combat capabilities of the standing army will be equipped with the same weapons and equipment as the standing army, and will be quickly mobilized during wartime to fight alongside the standing army; the second category is composed of a reserve that can support the standing army. This force will be responsible for the task of transporting, repairing, and protecting critical infrastructure during wartime; the third category is the backup unit for urban protection in the rear together with the civil defense team. The principles for the selection of these three categories of reserve forces are pretty consistent with the national army’s current thinking and logic of “combat forces”, “combat support forces”, and “service support forces”. However, the consistent implementation of this must be completely structured around the basic training and precise expertise training as the starting point.

Defeat must be considered before thinking about victory! In the face of the defense operations in Taiwan-Penghu, the national army may fight against a PLA army that has served for at least 2 years. We must seriously consider what a soldier with only four months of military training can do, and the kind of services and operations he is expected to be responsible for. More importantly, the reserve force reform headed by President Tsai Ing-wen must clearly stipulate how to mobilize and use the “reserve soldiers” who have only had four months of military training, and get it passed and approved by the Legislative Yuan such that an understanding and consensus between the government and the people is achieved. It is only by establishing a universal consensus that the tragedy of “Taiwanese believe that every other person will fight till the very end”!

(Hong Rong-i is a strategy scholar who has taught at The Graduate Institute of Strategic Studies)

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