For decades, Washington’s policy toward Taiwan has been oriented around the principle of strategic ambiguity. Under the policy, the U.S. has purposefully remained ambiguous on its position toward the cross-Strait relations and refrained from explicit support for Taiwan’s diplomacy and defense to avoid frictions between the U.S. and China over Taiwan.

In recent years, Washington, however, has significantly and explicitly ramped up its support for the island, ranging from the Taiwan Travel Act, arms sales, the pro-Taiwan comments by officials and congressmen, to its support for Taiwan’s participation in international organizations. All of the efforts can be seen as a deliberate signal to extend its support for Taiwan. Many of the analysts thus believe Washington’s policy toward Taiwan is shifting from strategic ambiguity to “less unambiguous” or even strategic clarity.

The rhetoric of “strategic clarity” can easily lead one to believe the U.S. is shifting its principle. In fact, this ignores the cause and practice of strategic ambiguity. The U.S. has deep differences with China vis-à-vis Taiwan, which have existed since the U.S. and China normalized their relations.

Taiwan is the most important and sensitive issue in Sino-U.S. relations. The U.S. administration has never rescinded its attention to the island. The Congress has pledged its staunch support. Every time Capitol Hill mentions its firm standing with Taiwan, it upsets the U.S.-China relations. The successive U.S. administrations have long been precarious in dealing with the tripartite relations. On one hand, Washington has to address the pressure from Beijing to reduce support for Taiwan, while on the other hand reiterating its commitment to Taiwan, assuring that it will never turn its back on Taiwan.

The U.S., in fact, is willing to commit its support for Taiwan’s diplomacy and defense, except that it has to do so tacitly. For example, whenever the U.S. revealed its arms sales to Taiwan, the Chinese Communist Party retaliated with a temporary halt of political and military exchanges. Though the U.S. will not abruptly stop its arms sales to Taiwan to avoid retaliation from China, it hopes the impact of the pro-Taiwan measures can be minimized on the U.S.-Sino relations.

For the U.S. authorities, the strategic ambiguity policy works as long as neither side across the Strait unilaterally changes the status quo. As such, there is no need for the U.S. to explicitly show support for Taipei or Beijing. Such ambiguity is helpful for Washington to maintain the U.S.-Sino relations and honor its commitment to Taiwan. It is important to point out that the status quo mentioned here is not what both leaders across the Strait have in mind. Instead, it is what the U.S. deems, maintaining order in the Taiwan Strait.

Over the decades after the severance of the U.S.-Taiwan diplomatic relations, the U.S. has remained vague vis-à-vis Taiwan, but it has not hesitated to condemn any action that could lead to conflicts. It also stepped in diplomatically and militarily at an appropriate time, as was the case in the 1996 Strait Crisis. As such, strategic ambiguity is not meant to spark confusion. The U.S. goal has always been clear: to maintain close interaction and cooperation with both sides while avoiding military clashes in the Strait.

Recently, Washington is bolstering support for Taiwan, a move showing the U.S believes Beijing’s pressure on Taiwan’s diplomacy and defense is undermining the status quo across the Strait. Beijing has asked global airlines and big multinational companies to correct their reference to Taiwan, suggesting it is using new tactics to increase pressure on Taiwan. China’s coercion is felt not just by the U.S. administration but also by the Congress. That’s why we see more high-level visits between the U.S. and Taiwan. It is a signal, both tacit and explicit, that Washington’s support for Taiwan remains unchanged.

For the deterrence strategy to work well, there is a need for the U.S. to send a timely signal that it will not tolerate any aggression. Given the increasing incursions by the People’s Liberation Army, Washington’s support for Taiwan is getting more explicit in the hope that Beijing understands the U.S. support for Taiwan remains unchanged. More incursions will only strengthen Washington’s stance for more clarity on a commitment to Taiwan’s defense, which will definitely anger Beijing.

Uncertainty over how the strategic ambiguity can deter cross-Strait attacks is likely to cause misunderstanding between the U.S. and China. The two obviously have different interpretations of who is undermining the status quo in the Strait. Beijing sees its hostilities against Taiwan, including constraining the island’s international space, arresting Taiwanese on espionage charges, advancing over the median line of the Strait, flying warplanes over Taiwan’s air defense identification zone, as a response to Taipei’s change in its mainland policy since 2016. In other words, Beijing does not think it fired the first shot to change the cross-Strait status quo.

Of course, both Taiwan and the U.S. see this differently. If the Chinese leadership assumes the U.S. is bolstering Taiwan instead of deterring China, Washington’s support for Taipei will not be seen as a need to assert its standing, but rather as a change in its longstanding policy of maintaining a balance across the Strait. The shift will deepen Beijing’s concern over the Taiwan issue. As such, it leaves Beijing no option but to step up pressure on Taiwan and cement its anti-access and area denial capabilities to deter the U.S. involvement in the Strait.

Under the context of tripartite deterrence, Taiwan has a role to play. In fact, Taiwan’s policies largely determine whether the U.S will continue to send signals to deter China. Of course, the U.S. as the one which is capable of deterring China from attacking, has to make Beijing aware of its determination to maintain stability in the Strait. As the tension is intensifying between the U.S.-Sino relations, the signal of deterrence can easily be ignored as a no big thing.

Washington knows this quite well. But at a time of U.S- China tit-for-tat over technology, trade wars, Covid-19, and economy, even if both sides honestly express their views on the cross-Strait issues and refrain from armed clashes, their position can easily be overshadowed by mutual accusations.

(Ping-kuei Chen, Associate professor of Department of Diplomacy at National Chengchi University)

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