The Kuomintang (KMT) Reform Committee has proposed party reform in four areas: cross-strait narrative, organizational reform, youth participation and financial stability. These priorities can be considered reasonable and consistent with the party’s core development strategy. Internally, this indicates that the new leader, Johnny Chiang Chichen, is turning a new leaf after KMT’s failure in the presidential election; externally, this allows the public to anticipate possible changes in Taiwan’s political environment and its cross-strait relations with China.

In Hong Kong, conservative forces that support the KMT and the Republic of China government, including former Hong Kong students who studied in Taiwan, those with Taiwanese spouses, business groups and members of Taiwanese expatriate associations, all remain influential. Generally, these groups have very favorable impressions of the Taiwanese public, and are hoping that the KMT could reinvigorate itself and bring constructive monitoring and competition back to Taiwan’s political environment. Hong Kong’s media also attach considerable importance to KMT’s reform. Unsurprisingly, the pro-Beijing camp insists that political exchange between Taiwan and China could only take place on the basis of the “One-China principle” and the “1992 Consensus”. Indeed, any room for interpreting the “One China, Respective Interpretations” policy can only be found in Taiwan. On the other hand, some might assume that the “1992 Consensus” gives KMT leverage in its handling of cross-strait relations and its pursuit of peaceful and reasonable relations between the two sides. This clearly underestimates the challenges of political survival the KMT faces in Taiwan.

Wishful thinking about Beijing

The KMT’s reform proposal claims that “one country, two systems” is “not an option for the Taiwanese” – a clear articulation of its standpoint that shows the party has its finger on the pulse of public opinion. Regardless of whether rejecting China’s offer of “one country, two systems” would leave war and coercion as the only options, there is no shortage of skeptics in the international community regarding Beijing’s promise of autonomy and its actual implementation in Hong Kong under “one country, two systems”. In Hong Kong, polls have revealed a significant decline in public confidence in “one country, two systems”. The prevailing sentiment is that the policy is not viable where Taiwan is concerned. More than half of the respondents support Taiwan’s re-entry into the United Nations, and close to 50% support Taiwan independence. Even though Hong Kongers’ opinion about Taiwan-China relations may sometimes be impressionistic and one-sided, it is nonetheless rooted in their actual experiences under “one country, two systems”.

President Tsai Ingwen’s speech following the swearing-in ceremony in May was marked by a complete absence of any reference to the “1992 Consensus”, which could only have ramped up the pressure on the KMT. To be fair, bilateral reconciliation under the “1992 Consensus” has never been based on equality and mutual recognition. Beijing has always rejected the Republic of China’s existence, and past efforts to find common ground amid differences have left Taiwan with very little room to influence the narrative.

The opinion shift in Taiwan regarding the “1992 Consensus” in recent years is probably not a result of any misunderstanding, but a spontaneous reaction to China’s stifling of Taiwan’s international presence and its oft-repeated intention to “achieve unification by military force”. The KMT has convened a group of scholars and experts to formulate a “four pillars” strategy regarding cross-strait relations: upholding the Republic of China’s sovereignty (rejecting “one country, two systems”), safeguarding freedom, democracy and human rights, prioritizing the security of Taiwan, and creating win-win cross-strait relations. Among its many proposals, however, only the new party protocols for cross-strait exchange and the Cross-Strait Agreement Supervisory Act can be implemented unilaterally. All the other expectations it has with regard to Beijing (such as political reform, human rights agreements, and the halting of military exercises near Taiwan) seem to be nothing more than wishful thinking.

The truth is, Taiwan has neither the political will nor military might for war. Peaceful cross-strait relations is highly dependent on whether Beijing’s leaders see Taiwan as a “problem” or a distinct Chinese community that deserves being treated with respect and the etiquette of co-existence.

The KMT’s latest reform indicates that it has re-oriented itself to echo public opinion in Taiwan. It is vital for KMT to adjust their narrative if they are to garner the support of young voters. To try to shoehorn a long democratized Taiwan into the framework of the muddled political understanding of 30 years ago would not only be illegitimate, but a different kind of cross-generational injustice.

Expecting Johnny Chiang to redefine the KMT’s position on cross-straits relations in his first 100 days in office would perhaps be asking too much. But the lack of a clear philosophical foundation and publicity has always been KMT’s weakness. KMT is no longer a dominant political party, but it still retains some of a Leninist party’s conservative and authoritarian traditions. Even in times of limited resources, it is still concerned with political “face”, hierarchy and moral superiority. Although there are capable and motivated members in the party, promoting KMT’s reform and progress is a journey fraught with difficulty.

(Yeh Kuo Hao, Adjunct Lecturer, Centre for China Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong)

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