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Biden rebuilds coalition, a show of strength for China | Wang Hung-Jen

蘋果日報 2021/03/19 10:40


Ahead of their trip to Asia, Secretary of State John Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin gave a preview in an article published by the Washington Post that the new Biden administration would seek to rebuild the power of international alliances and place value on long-neglected partnerships. What they are saying is that the US will no longer fight alone, but will join forces with other democratic countries that share the same goals, values and responsibilities to meet the urgent challenges and threats from China.
In fact, the Biden administration has been making frequent moves against China in recent months. Not only has it continued the Trump-era perception of China as a threat, but it has also been strengthening its role in the Indo-Pacific region through practical actions. There is also less of an impression of bargaining with Asian allies and more of a missionary obsession with principles and values.
The White House’s “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance” released on Mar 3rd of this year is a clear statement of the new Biden administration’s approach to US-China relations. The report notes that China and Russia, along with other authoritarian regimes, are all growing rivals to the US, with China as the only competitor with the potential to combine its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to jeopardize a stable world order. The threat is not only at the level of “interests” but also in the values and beliefs of America, including its long-standing commitment to the world order: democracy and human rights. This is why the report concludes by emphasizing that the US will not neglect its commitments in order to do business in China. Therefore, the Biden administration will continue to support the development of democracy in Taiwan and stand up for democracy, human rights, and human dignity alongside Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet.
The US is demonstrating an increasingly clear and assertive stance toward China. What the new Biden administration is doing now is to patch things up, reestablish its leadership position, and demonstrate its power to China in the hope that China will be cowed into regressing in its actions and adjusting its values. Blinken said in an interview with former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in late February that the US cannot turn a blind eye when Xinjiang Uyghurs are being put into concentration camps, or when democracy is being trampled in Hong Kong, and that the US should stand up and point out China’s faults. Although there are different levels of cooperation, competition, and hostility in the US relationship with China, the US must approach China from a position of strength by bringing together allies to prevent China from unilaterally changing the status quo.
This was reflected in the recently released US-Japan Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) meeting. When Hillary Clinton was Secretary of State, she was the first diplomat to push vigorously for the US to devote various resources to Asian affairs, and she was also the most diligent Secretary of State to visit Asian-Pacific countries. Today, it can be said that Blinken is resuming the policy initiative of “rebuilding Asian partnerships and cooperation with allies,” which cannot be described as a breakthrough strategy. The success of the US-led Indo-Pacific alliance will depend on China’s response, the risk aversion of small and medium-sized countries, and the ability of the US to reconcile differences among its allies.
First, when Biden convened the Quad, or Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with the leaders of Japan, India and Australia, almost simultaneously, China formed a “Group of Friends in Defense of the Charter of the United Nations” with authoritarian states such as Russia, North Korea and Iran. This echoes what Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said publicly during China’s Two Sessions: “When it comes to Sino-US relations, the first thing is to abide by the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, which is clearly stipulated in the UN Charter.” China has often reminded the US that the two countries have common interests so they should cooperate, and where there are differences, they can be controlled first and then resolved.
However, China’s “core interests” (including Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan) are internal affairs that are off-limits, lest they violate the UN Charter on interference in internal affairs. For the new Biden administration, China’s untouchable “core interests” are precisely those that contradict American core interests and values, such as democracy and human rights. When both sides have “core interests” that cannot be touched, they must show their strength and see whose “core interests” can ultimately be compromised.
Moreover, the earlier analysis of small and medium-sized countries’ risk-averse strategies is actually their reluctance to take sides when they are caught between major powers, and also the necessary development of small and medium-sized countries for survival. There are unresolved border tensions between China and India, but the two countries have held high-level talks after the conflict, and recently both sides have even withdrawn their troops from the disputed area without restraint. Japan has long adopted the separation of politics and economics with China, shelving differences over political and diplomatic issues while pursuing benefits from economic and energy cooperation. South Korea is reluctant to confront China because of President Moon Jae-in. In the case of Australia, the relationship with China has deteriorated as a result of its advocacy for the investigation of the origin of the novel coronavirus. Nevertheless, all these countries have signed the RECEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) with China, forming another form of cooperation or alliance.
Of course, there are those small and medium-sized countries that reap benefits from bilateral relations and engage in conditional one-sided tactics. North Korea, for example, has refused to communicate with the new Biden administration and threatened the US to refrain from causing trouble; whereas Taiwan, for example, has chosen to strengthen its high-level interaction with the US and refused to break the ice in cross-strait relations. All of these add to the dramatic effect of the current US-China confrontation.
Finally, the alliances and partnerships the US is trying to build in Asia are not strictly multilateral in nature, but rather a hub-and-spoke network based on multiple bilateral relationships. The difference between the two is that a multilateral alliance system is more likely to generate shared values and collective effects, while a hub-and-spoke system relies on a central hegemonic power (the US) to spur action. Should the US fail to demonstrate its strength or willingness, any distrust within the alliance will erupt, leaving its members seemingly in harmony but actually at variance.
It is apparent from the relationship between Japan and South Korea: the trade conflicts, the termination of the military intelligence-sharing agreement, and even the removal of each other from their own list of preferred trading partners due to controversies over forced labor and comfort women during World War II. All of these demonstrate how difficult it is for the US to maintain a stable multilateral alliance system, not to mention the fact that China will take advantage of the situation to intimidate or rope in US allies.
The so-called high-level US-China diplomatic meeting, in which the US Secretary of State met with two Chinese diplomatic representatives in Alaska on his way back from Japan and South Korea, was even more like a gesture of strength to China. Since both the US and China are adamant about their core interests, it is doubtful that the Chinese side can bring any compromise proposal forward. It is foreseeable that in the end, each side will state its own position that will serve as the basis for war in the future.
(Wang Hung-Jen is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science of National Cheng Kung University.)
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