As the “Two Sessions” is underway in Beijing, what Hongkongers are most concerned about is, of course, subjects related to Hong Kong. According to various news sources from Beijing, the “incomplete two systems” have already become the “non-exist two systems.” Refusing defeat, Beijing is determined to get rid of the “two systems” as soon as possible. Since declaring it has to firmly grasp the full governance of Hong Kong, Beijing has enforced numerous policies and measures, which included taking control of the Legislative Council (LegCo), operation of the Hong Kong government, personnel including the permanent secretary of the civil service system, education and judiciary sectors, etc. These “Two Sessions” might be making reckless decisions again without knowing Hong Kong’s real situation.

For the first time, Wang Yang, Chairman of the CPPCC, did not mention “one country, two systems.” Looking back, Beijing had already stopped talking about the “50 years unchanged” pledge five years after the Handover of Hong Kong. Since 2004, it has promoted the discussion on patriotism via Tsang Hin-chi, a member of the Standing Committee of the NPC, and labeled people like Martin Lee as “unpatriotic”, similar to what Xiao Baolong, Director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, has labeled Jimmy Lai, Benny Tai, and Joshua Wong. Then Qiao Xiaoyang came to Hong Kong and declared Beijing’s definition of a “high degree of autonomy” is not absolute autonomy. The CPPCC report from Wang Yang had no longer included “Hong Kong people rule Hong Kong” since last year, and now even “one country, two systems” has been omitted. It is evident that the killing of the “two systems” has been a prolonged goal of the CCP’s.

How did we get here? A deep-seated reason is that since Taiwan already clearly indicated it does not believe in “one country, two systems”, the mainland decided it does not have to “silently tolerate” Hong Kong’s “uncontrollable situation” anymore. Also, since the Jul.1 protest in 2003, Beijing began to worry that Hong Kong would become “the base of opposition (both domestic and foreign power, and within and outside the party)” and might awake the devil in the hearts of the leftists to fight. Therefore it has started to make a series of systematic deployments from 2004 onward to highlight “one country” and suppress “two systems.”

It is worth noting that in 2012, many ideas and deployments for suppressing the two systems had already begun taking shape. The mainland-published “Blue Book of Hong Kong: Annual Report on Development of Hong Kong (2012)” outlined the main contour of specific measures which have become today’s reality. Take the education section, for example, the book proposed that the senior officials ought to be someone capable and with ideas, that liberal studies must be stopped, and the Education Bureau should have stronger leadership towards schools and downplay the school-based management policy. In terms of personnel, the central government should have the “right of recommendation” (a subtle way of saying: nominated by the Chief Executive, appointed by the central government”), the permanent secretaries have to be approved by the central government like the department secretaries. They also have to “pass the ultimate political system, which will be unchanged until 2047.”

The above shows that 2012 was the turning point for the CCP’s Hong Kong ruling policy. I have suggested an in-depth analysis on this topic on numerous occasions, yet Hongkongers have not paid much attention to Beijing’s change of ideologies and directions since 2004 because the crisis did not seem to be cutting close, only to finally take notice now.

Xia’s suggestion of increasing the future Chief Executive election committee to 1,500 members shows Beijing’s political normality of refusing defeat. The current political and election systems have both been approved by Beijing before implemented by the Hong Kong government. Take the “list proportional representation” (PR) used in the LegCo election as an example. The authority decided to apply PR to protect the pro-Beijing camp, which was the minority at the time, to guarantee its seats in LegCo. However, today, the same system is now protecting the pan-democrats (pan-dems) who are the minority, and therefore Beijing is looking into removing the PR system.

Another example is the election of the 117 Chief Executive election committee seats conducted through an internal District Council election, which was once considered a guaranteed win by the pro-Beijing camp. By including the pro-Beijing camp district councilors in the election committee, the government can somewhat argue that there were “grassroots representations”. What they had not expected was due to the huge loss by the pro-Beijing camp in the latest district council election, the 117 election committee seats would very likely be taken up by pan-dems, especially the young ones. This has touched the nerves of Beijing, therefore a solution to eradicate was needed. As such, a new explanation today is that the district councils are responsible for local affairs that have little to do with the political system. If this is not a refusal of defeat, then what is? It also matches the CCP’s political normality. It cares only about its current political need and does not care if its action today contradicts its action yesterday. What is worrying is the actions that suit today’s political need may not be suitable tomorrow, and so they are also subject to change at any moment.

Based on this mentality, there is a rumor within the pro-Beijing camp recently that someone suggested, instead of closing every election loophole as it arises, which does nothing for the loopholes in the future and could lead to even bigger problems, why not simply cancel the election altogether? This suggestion aligns with the mentality of the aforementioned “pass the ultimate political system until 2047” well. By then, the deadline of “one country, two systems” would arrive.

People always ask, “how far would Beijing go?” No one knows, but there seems to be no end to its extremity. To attempt to get into its head, why not take a peek at the policies in the mainland after the CCP took power in 1949. How did it take over a city? How did it control the “white areas” (areas not directly governed by the CCP)? How did it grow its power? Even though today’s situation is different from that then, their natures are similar. While the CCP claims to have been working on a transformation from a revolutionary party to a ruling party, there are too many legacy markings. We might be able to get clues on how the CCP is governing Hong Kong today from its early days in power. All in all, in the face of difficulties, we must stay awake - the kind that is not just about not being in a dream, but one that is also about a disregard of reality. Only then could we ride out the storm and overcome the difficulties.

(Johnny Lau Yui-siu, current affairs commentator)

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