Let’s Clubhouse in Taiwanese, a new type of propaganda|Liu Shu-ting
Clubhouse, a voice-based social media app, is rapidly spreading its influence. Though it is blocked by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Chinese tech companies including Xiaomi Corporation and TikTok’s owner ByteDance are said to be developing Clubhouse-like apps for China. At the same time, China’s propaganda system is trying to expand its presence on the trending audio apps. For example, Ministry of Foreign Affairs said it has opened an account on Bilibili, a popular Chinese live streaming platform. Amid the hype of audio chat rooms, CCP is likely to start a new type of propaganda war against Taiwan.
CCP is using social media as a tool to woo younger generations. And it is trying to leverage the influence of the new media in three ways: First, to help build a China-specific brand, like TikTok;Second, to promote the use of domestic social apps, like WeChat, while blocking WhatsApp; Third, it has banned the public from using international platforms, like Twitter, while allowing state media and diplomats to use them for propaganda campaigns.
Narrowing distance in a Taiwanese accent
The popularity of Clubhouse is driving a new type of communication where lots of different people use voice instead of texts to exchange views. Chinese President Xi Jinping has stressed the need to build a new type of mainstream media, a move seen as an opportunity for Chinese tech firms to develop or clone a Chinese version of Clubhouse. It is also likely for Beijing to use Clubhouse as a platform for pro-China propaganda. Clubhouse, known for its real-time voice communication and popularity among celebrities, is increasing its influence of swaying public opinion and thereby is expected to be a powerful weapon for information and cognitive warfare.
Voice communication is susceptible to manipulation. Voice delivers information and emotions via content, speed and tone. Some can use voice communication to fan negative emotions, triggering instinctive, fast and inflammatory remarks. Clubhouse allows users to multitask and not have to be fully occupied, implying you can have it play in the background while doing other things. These features allow the users to treat it as a companion. Over time, users have a hard time weaning from it, opening the door for the app to condition their mindset and cognition.
The real-time discussion makes it impossible to make fact-checking and stop the spread of misinformation from the very beginning. As Clubhouse can connect you with celebrities, some may change their voice to impersonate celebrities to gain trust. Some may use sound technology to spread fake and misleading information. The conversation on Clubhouse is wiped once a room closes, making it almost impossible to hold people accountable for their words. Another problem with Clubhouse is that the effect of word of mouth can be amplified by spreading from online to offline.
Celebrities play a key role in the Clubhouse sensation. Many of them host chat rooms and create a global bonanza. As hosts have the power to mute/unmute participants, guide discussions and block dissent, some fear opinion is likely to be swayed. Clubhouse forms a celebrity-centered network with discussions focusing on a specific person or issue. The network has a tendency to attract radical groups, a characteristic that is likely to facilitate the spread of controversies.
Opinion leaders are the core and main target of information warfare. CCP, for instance, has introduced a series of measures to block Internet influencers. Diplomats signed up on social media to shape international views. Beijing has created and purchased a large number of accounts to spread information in its favor.
Users can listen to different languages and accents from around the world on audio social apps. And the way of use varies from place to place. The localization features — building an experience that users feel native to them can help encourage the public to use the platform for diplomacy. But it can also be used by foreigners as a means to manipulate information. If the CCP launches audio propaganda at Taiwanese, it is likely to turn to (bribe) Taiwan’s high-profile personalities and train Taiwanese-speaking influencers. The CCP is embarking on cognitive warfare against Taiwan through these local proxies who are trying to narrow distance by employing penetrating “voice expressions” in local accent and dialect.
The new type of warfare involves more than individual proxies. The CCP has to build a supply chain ranging from talent pool, content production to technical know-how. Moreover, it has to seek cooperation with the island’s pro-China mainstream media and youth exchange agencies. It is expected that the CCP will ride on the recent Clubhouse hype to consolidate its ties with the offline pro-China communities and wage a new type of cognitive warfare against Taiwan.
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