Will Taiwanese accept the 92 Consensus?|Austin Wang, Yao-Yuan Yeh, Fang-Yu Chen, Charles K.S. Wu
Recently, Taiwan’s ex-president Ma Ying-jeou exchanged views on cross-Strait relations with Susan Thornton, former acting Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and other former officials in a virtual conference. Ma stressed that Taiwan should restore conversation with China on the basis of the “1992 Consensus” to reduce current tensions. Ma argues that support for the Consensus should be a non-partisan issue.
Indeed, both DPP and KMT hold that peace with China is important. Yet, the prerequisite for conversation is different for the DPP. President Tsai has also expressed her willingness to talk to Beijing when conditions of equality and dignity are met. The condition has proven difficult to actualize, however. On multiple occasions, Beijing has repeatedly reiterated that bilateral conversation could only take place under the framework of the 1992 Consensus. Thus, cross-Strait conversations came to a halt as Tsai refused to accept the Consensus. The question is: will the Consensus help safeguard Taiwan’s equality and dignity when interacting with China?
Unfortunately, the answer is no. The truth is, upholding the Consensus is akin to accepting China’s proposed One China Principle, which argues that Taiwan is part of China. For Beijing, the Consensus simply indicates that there is only one China and Taiwan is part of it; for Taipei (especially those in the KMT), the Consensus implies that there is one China, but both sides adopt a different definition of what constitutes it. KMT believes that the definition will allow Taiwan to maintain its equality on the surface, but serious thinking would reveal that it is still playing into China’s propaganda that there is only one China. In short, the Consensus is harmful to the equality and dignity that Taipei deems as critical.
How supportive is the public in Taiwan of the Consensus? Duke University’s Taiwan National Security Survey is the often-cited source to gauge public sentiment on this issue. During the past two decades, the survey consistently reveals that the majority of the public is supportive; at times, the gap between support and disapproval could be over 20% (e.g., in 2015, support and disapproval is 53% and 31%). Polls after Tsai came into office continued this trend: in both 2016 and 2019, the gaps were still over 20%. The DPP government does not change how the public views the Consensus systemically.
Things are different this year. The most recent survey released in October showed drastic changes in how the public in Taiwan views the Consensus. Support and disapproval stood at 46% and 42%, respectively. Several notable implications: 1) first time in decades that support dropped to less than 50%; 2) a sizeable increase in disapproval rate, reducing the gaps from 26% in 2018 to 4% in 2020.
Taking political identification into consideration reveals the source of the change in public support. Support among pan-blue (pro-KMT) supporters is stable, hovering around 85% in both 2018 and 2020. Support for the 92 Consensus dropped in both the pan-green (pro-DPP) supporters and independent citizens. The former reduced their support from 39% to 30% in 2020 and the latter from 63% to 54%.
The change in support help explains each party’s policy toward cross-Strait relations. The KMT continues to hold on to the Consensus as it is still a salient issue among its constituents. For the pan-Green, the DPP has gradually shifted from supporting the Consensus for economic benefits in the party to now rejecting it. Most importantly, other minority parities should also distance themselves from the Consensus as most independents now object to the Consensus.
Research by our team has explored the underlying reasons for the changes in public opinion. In a survey on the definition of Consensus, we found that “Taiwanese people have no consensus on the definition of the 1992 Consensus.” Only a third of respondents could correctly identify the definition of the Consensus, which according to the KMT means that ROC represents Taiwan, PRC represents the mainland, and the two governments belong to the same country waiting for unification. Another third of the respondents chose a very wrong definition of Taiwan independence (ROC represents Taiwan, PRC represents the mainland, and the two governments belong to two different countries.). Still, the other 17 percent of respondents chose the old definition of cross-strait relations (ROC reunifying China) way before the term 1992 consensus was created.
Another major reason explaining why the public becomes disillusioned with the Consensus has to do with Xi Jinping linking the 1992 consensus with the “One Country Two Systems” framework. Ever since Xi’s speech at the 40th anniversary of issuing message to compatriots in Taiwan, support for the term had an irrevocable decline. Even polls during polarized political timing such as the 2020 presidential election revealed no change in the pattern.
The odds are against the 1992 Consensus surviving in the long run. Without relying on acknowledging the Consensus, the current administration has enjoyed high levels of approval in diplomatic performance. The poll result would further push the DPP to stay away from the Consensus. The KMT will likely adhere to the Consensus because of their long-term standings on the One China Principle and they believe that Taiwan should listen to China’s prerequisite to layout the conversations. Also, KMT might tap into independent voters that support the Consensus. Whether that would work or not remains to be seen. If recent events offer some basis for prediction, then it is unlikely that support for the Consensus will pick up soon. The crackdown on democratic protests in Hong Kong has further tainted the image of the CCP, and relatedly, views about the Consensus among the public in Taiwan.
We believe that the US is aware of the changes of support for the Consensus among the public. Granted, such a change would not alter the current status quo across the Strait. What is important is that the Consensus (and especially the One-China Principle) should not be a starting point for both sides of the Strait to engage in a peaceful conversation. It is time to say goodbye to the 1992 Consensus.
(Austin Wang (
[email protected]) is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Twitter: @wearytolove
Yao-Yuan Yeh (
[email protected]) is Associate Professor of International Studies and Chair of the Department of International Studies and Modern Languages at the University of St. Thomas, Houston. Twitter: @yeh2sctw
Fang-Yu Chen (
[email protected]) is PhD in Political Science at Michigan State University. Twitter: @FangYu_80168
Charles K.S. Wu (
[email protected]) is PhD candidate in Political Science at Purdue University. Twitter: @kuanshengtwn)
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