In the past month, the debate in Washington over its policy on Taiwan has reached its most heated moment in recent decades. First, the recently adopted U.S. Democratic Party platform removed references to the recognition of the “one-China policy,” which aroused criticism from China’s official mouthpiece, the Global Times. Then the theme topic of this month’s academic journal issued by the U.S. Military Academy at West Point is on the short-term and long-term military strategies of the Taiwan Strait, with more than a dozen articles penned by American soldiers, scholars, and think tanks to discuss military developments across the Taiwan Strait.

In these few days, there have been articles published by Foreign Affairs, the leading magazine for in-depth analysis of U.S. foreign policy, written by CSIS, RAND, CFR and other well-known Asian experts from the liberal and conservative think tanks, discussing whether the U.S. should continue to maintain the over half a century “strategic ambiguity” policy on the cross-strait relationship. The debate is even joined by scholars who had helped promote the Taiwan Relations Act before and after the severance of the diplomatic relationship between the U.S. and Taiwan in 1979.

What is meant by strategic ambiguity? In the past, the U.S. believed that it would be in the best interest of America to maintain the Taiwan Strait status quo. The recently declassified White House document has confirmed that, since President Ronald Reagan’s administration, American arms sales to Taiwan have been maintained to support its defense capabilities based on military threats posed by Beijing. In spite of that, Washington has deliberately kept its defense commitments to Taiwan unpublic. This policy is inherently different from that with Japan and the Philippines. At the same time, the U.S. also deliberately avoided an explicit stance to defend Taiwan. The U.S. used to believe that a commitment to defend Taiwan could encourage a counterattack against the mainland or further declaration of independence, while its refusal to assist in the defense of Taiwan could increase the likelihood of the use of force by China. Therefore, it believed strategic ambiguity can prevent China and Taiwan from immediately changing the existing state of affairs, avoiding a cross-strait war and thereby preserving this status quo.

However, John J. Mearsheimer, an American political scientist and international relations scholar, who belongs to the realist school of thought, has already written an article six years ago warning that this kind of policy is unsustainable. This is because, he argued, China will continue to substantially increase its military build-up and promote patriotism, while in the long-run, the U.S. will inevitably encounter a time when it is no longer cost-effective to come to Taiwan’s defense and that is when it will bid farewell to Taiwan.

The heated debate six years later comes at a time when China has taken an increasingly aggressive stance and is seeking greater clarity on U.S. intentions. For example, the reclamation and militarization of the Mischief Reefs in the South China Sea, disregarding the Hague arbitration; the cyberattacks on Taiwan with great fanfare; the fake news and local cooperators, etc. These actions directly challenge the U.S.'s original assumption that “strategic ambiguity can prevent China from changing the status quo.” They may even prompt the U.S. to reflect on the definition of the so-called status quo across the Taiwan Strait. At the end of August at the Heritage Foundation, an American conservative think tank, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs David R. Stilwell said in his remarks that the status quo across the Taiwan Strait has been unilaterally altered by China, hence this is the time to further cooperate with Taiwan.

In this wave of discussions, the argument in favor of maintaining strategic ambiguity is that although, during her two terms in office, President Tsai Ing-wen has been stable and has not aggravated China, there is still too much uncertainty in subsequent Taiwan leaders and the future public opinion in Taiwan. Washington’s commitment to Taiwan could cause public opinion to greatly promote Taiwan’s independence and push Beijing to the brink of war. Moreover, Taiwan has not yet encountered direct force violations. On the other hand, the argument in favor of shifting to “strategic clarity” believes that rising Chinese aggression towards Taiwan is too apparent, and clarity would reinforce deterrence. Furthermore, there is no sign of any arbitrary use of force to provoke foreign forces by those countries that the U.S. has pledged to defend. Taiwan will not be so irresponsible as to provoke China just because of the U.S. military’s defense. Besides, will China give up its intimidation through the use of force in the absence of Taiwan independence?

Taiwan, as the protagonist of the heated discussion, cannot just be a bystander. Of course, Taiwan also cannot be like China and disrespectfully slam its fist down on the table in anger at the United Nations. However, Taiwan can at least provide more evidence and other aspects to influence American think tanks and public opinion, and calculate cost-effectiveness to remodel the approach of the strategy. Lii Wen, director of Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party’s Lienchiang County Chapter, is an analyst on foreign policy and regional security issues. Previously, he submitted an article to discuss the Chinese illegally dredging sea sand along the coastal waters of Taiwan and the Philippines. This was cited by think tank scholars as one of the foundations of the heated debate. Taiwan’s reserve mobilization capacity and military status have also recently become the subject of review in many submitted articles. This is because Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities will directly affect the cost calculation of the U.S.' defense, and these discussions will in turn give Taiwan itself domestic and foreign pressure to promote improvement.

The Institute for National Defense and Security Research and some non-governmental organizations have also made many records and discussions with respect to China’s strategies on the military, the Internet, contractual aspects and the exchange of economy for politics. After all, Taiwan is located in the field and has rich experience whether the topic is cyber attacks, local cooperators or cross-strait underground exchanges. If it can further penetrate into the U.S. policy discussion network, there could be more clarity with the so-called status quo.

On the other hand, what is the Taiwan public opinion’s understanding towards the U.S.' decision-making with respect to “strategic clarity” or “strategic ambiguity”? In addition, Taiwan also needs to explain more clearly its own will to purchase arms or strengthen its own defense. How will a shift to “strategic clarity” impact Taiwan’s public opinion? What is the crux of the public opinion rebound in response to the resumption of conscription? At the present, discussions in the U.S. are mostly based on assumptions, and obviously the assumptions of the parties are not consistent, and the answer lies in Taiwan itself.

The intensity and breadth of the recent U.S. debate on its Taiwan policy are the highest in recent decades. Moreover, the reason for the debate is not just because of the upcoming presidential election, but also for the structural factor in the change in US-China-Taiwan relations. This also means that relevant discussions will not end with election day, and Taiwan should participate more actively in this rare window of opportunity.

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